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ABSTRACT
Global demand of fish for consumption in developing nations is expected to continue to
rise in the near future, putting pressure on stocks that are already overexploited. In the territorial
waters of Panama there is a constant struggle between commercial vessels with high yield,
subsistence fishermen trying to feed a remote village, and ecosystem services struggling to
sustain themselves. These services are the direct and indirect benefits received by the population
in the form of food, raw materials, nutrient cycling, and disaster regulation. They are being
degraded by illegal and unregulated fishing, bottom trawlers raking the benthos and destroying
coral reefs, longlines responsible for thousands of sea turtle and bird deaths, and purse seines that
decrease species biodiversity in fish stock. While the government has passed laws to reduce the
environmental impact the industrial fisheries have, they lack effective enforcement. An
alternative approach is to place monetary values on ecosystem services to show the monetary
value of previously unrepresented natural capital. Application of this method to fisheries
management can educate policy makers on the economic losses to expect if overfishing of the
seas continues and provide the economic imperative to lessen impacts on oceanic ecosystems.
Through comparative analysis it is shown that the market value of all fish catch in Panamanian
waters is less than that which is provided by the ecosystem services in the area. Open ocean and
coral reef ecosystem services provide a combined $103 billion per year while the highest
grossing fish catch in Panamanian waters managed to net $356 million in 2004. There is an
economic and political imperative to protect and promote sustainability of not only the fish
stock, but all ecosystem services in the ocean.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Fisheries are increasingly impacted by climate change and overfishing as demand for fish
protein increases. Panama leads this demand in Central America and has overexploited it’s
fisheries due to mismanagement of growth (Durán & Puentes 2012, pg. 13). The research
question of this thesis is: are economic rents derived from the fishing industry less than the
ecosystem service values? The hypothesis is that rents are indeed less than ecosystem services
values.
Using a method derived from extensive academic research on ecosystem values, we will
assess the total economic worth of the ecosystem provisions of Panama’s open ocean and coral
reefs. These ecosystems are the source of natural capital for the country and are commonly
unvalued due to difficulties in assessment. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
(TEEB) method provides estimates of the ecosystem and its provisions, giving us a platform to
compare the contributions of the ecosystems to the value of fisheries.
Ecosystems provide value in terms of climate regulation, materials, nutrient cycling, and
erosion prevention. Poor regulation of these services leads to loss of national wealth and the
beneficial effects of said systems (TEEB 2010, pg. 43). Examining the regulations and
enforcement policy of Panama and the fishing activity will provide a metric of efficacy of the
agencies charged with ensuring environmental longevity in the country.
This thesis seeks to expand the application of the ecological economic model to a region
at a crucial point of development in which natural capital is not properly monetized and will
likely be sacrificed for short-term profit and progress. The profit maximizing imperative of
fisheries, as with all market-based industry, has specific desire to lessen regulation as these
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regulations can often place costs on vessels or lessen their maximum profit by lessening catch.
Regulation policy through means of gear, method, limits, and areas of restriction are the most
common. Limitations or alterations on gear can require vessels to purchase new nets due to size
restrictions. As seen in Panamanian legislation the method of reeling in longline and purse seines
requires specific size rollers, meaning previous mechanisms must be scrapped or sold off and
new rollers purchased to continue using the same method. These kinds of regulations cost vessels
capital investment. Some of these regulations even lessen catch rate, and thereby profit “rate”
(FAO 2008). The implementation of no-fish marine protected areas (MPAs) effectively reduces
the area in which vessels can actively troll for their target species. As the tuna and skipjack
species, especially in the Pacific region, are known to travel quite far in search of their own food
they have a greater chance of ending up schooling in no-fish MPAs (IUCN 2012). These areas
have compounding positive impacts on fisheries as a whole (Halpern 2003, Pérez-Ruzafa et al.
2008). These restrictions and regulations become politically charged as they limit profits of
vessels and are commonly argued by industry to not support sustainable levels of fish stock.
Research suggests the opposite, posing a need for policy influenced by peer-reviewed science to
shape regulation decisions (Cowan et al. 2012, Durán & Puentes 2012, Fletcher et al. 2012).
Trophic mining, the systemic targeting of top-level fish species, allows for high catch
rates that can be followed by decline in population and possible unsustainable levels of stock
(Pauly et al. 1998). A moderate decline in fish catch has been recorded by Panamanian fisheries
since 2006 (UN Data, 2011). While specific species analysis in Panamanian waters has yet to be
conducted, the consensus of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC 2012), the
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN 2012), and other regional studies is that
there is current overexploitation of the fish stock. The damage and possible collapse of this
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ecosystem as result of a poorly managed fishery will affect the economy of Panama. This
research aims to place a value on the natural capital of the ecosystem compared to the economic
rents derived from it, providing an analysis of fisheries management that fails to account for the
total natural wealth at stake and the policies that have been unable to promote sustainable
practices.
The TEEB report that is the foundation for the economic analysis states that “valuation
may play an increasing role in policy making” (2010, pg. 43). Policy decisions can often be
decided based upon cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as it offers a simple comparison of actions and
their gains or losses in standardized monetary value. Making these comparisons while failing to
account for ecosystem service values, which can “save on future municipal costs, boost local
economies, enhance quality of life and help secure livelihoods” (TEEB 2010, pg. 174), lacks a
complete picture of total costs and benefits. Placing values on the ecosystem services gives a
dollar value to the contributing material and energy outputs of said systems that, in a natural and
sustainable position, come at no cost to the public or state. Failing to account for these values
would result in catastrophic damage to an entire nation’s ecological wealth, and should be
characterized as a loss of prospective gross domestic product (GDP) in as such these ecosystems
contribute directly to the health of a state’s economy (TEEB 2010: p. 35).
The accessible records of Panamanian fishery legislation, beginning in 1959, are outlined
and examined for their impacts on fisheries management. The restriction of fishing methods and
technology, designating of MPAs, regional restrictions, and creation of enforcement agencies are
the most common policies enacted by the National Assembly of Panama. As noted previously,
the IUCN (2011), Fishery Resources Monitoring System (FIRMS 2012), and Durán & Puentes
(2012) all define the region of Panamanian fisheries to be overexploited. This serves to show the
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policies of fishing regulation in Panama are not functioning to ensure a sustainable system as
decreed by Law Number 17 in 1959.
The TEEB reports serve as a policy making guidebook for various levels of state actors.
It has been used in eight Caribbean island nations to influence national governments to enact
policy for endangered ecosystems through the TEEB valuation methods. The economic
imperative of preservation when provided the monetary value of the services of ecosystems has
been proven in these developing nations. By using the methodology of ecosystem service
valuation, analyzing the policies enacted by the Panamanian government, and considering their
impact on the environment, the hypothesis as to whether economic rents are prioritized over
ecosystem services will be explored. Policies enacted will also be examined as a measure of
sustainable actions to prevent or decrease overexploitation of the fish stock.
Country Profile
Panama’s history is one of the more unique in Latin America due to impactful influences
from outside nations, most notably the United States. Native tribes were subjected to exploitation
from the Spanish Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries. Coastal tribes such as the Cueva were
completely exterminated in the exploration of gold and pearls on the isthmus as well as the
explorers search for a path to the Pacific Ocean. Little is known of these tribes as their history
was not well documented and most traces were destroyed by the Spanish conquistadors.
Christopher Columbus is noted as having formed the first settlement in the to-this-day remote
area of the Darién in 1503 (BBC News 2001).
The isthmus became more important as colonization of the western side of South
America by Europeans increased, most notably the finding of precious metals. Portaging, the
practice of carrying a ship over land between two bodies of water, was used to decrease the time
4

to transport goods to and from Spain and its new settlements. The dense jungle and hostile tribes
that managed to persevere caused more and more losses of these trips, along with pirates from
other European trading companies, placing an imperative on Spanish explorers to quell the
rebellious natives and sure up their control of the isthmus.
Over the next two centuries the region was torn apart by colonialism from Spanish,
Dutch, Scottish, and English armadas. Spain would eventually manage to control the region,
deeming the city of Panama to be a crucial outpost in the New World. Much of the population
that opposed this new rule fled to the interior or to outlying islands. This would become
important in the demographics of the country later. In the early 18th century, Spain began to lose
influence and power in Panama as the population became rebellious and left the city to develop
the land in attempt to declare independence. In 1821 the Spanish Empire was ousted from the
city of Panama with help from Colombia in exchange for agreeing to become part of the
neighboring state. Interest from the United States started shortly before the new independence
from the European influence and quickly developed as the U.S. expanded westward (Harding
2006).
Throughout the 19th century the United States attempted to garner influence in the
isthmus, competing with France in attempts to build a trans-oceanic canal. Populations that had
moved to the interior were removed from the influence of the new governance of Colombia.
Only the city of Panama was in true control. Infighting between Spain and Colombia included
the new province of Panama with the start of the Thousand Days War. During this time the
United States attempted to gain rights to build a trans-oceanic canal in the Colombian province
of Panama. The resulting Hay-Herrán Treaty was signed and ratified by the U.S. Senate, but not
the Colombian Senate. Historians suggest that the reason the treaty was not ratified in Colombia
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was the rogue nature of Herrán’s negotiations, lacking direct support from the Colombian
government. While Colombia managed to overcome the Spanish Empire, the United States had
turned to another avenue in order to gain rights to build the canal in Panama. Support for a
Panamanian rebellion was fueled by U.S. support in exchange for “sovereign right” to the area
extended out 10 miles on either side along the canal to be built as result of the Hay–BunauVarilla Treaty on 1903 which included Panama’s declaration of independence from Colombia.
Construction started on the canal that year and was finished in 1914, though Colombia would not
recognize Panamanian independence until 1921 when the United States finally ratified the
Thomson–Urrutia Treaty to pay Colombia its dues to accept the terms of independence
(McCullough 1977). The influence of the United States would further shape the political turmoil
still present in the country today.
The Panama Canal construction caused an influx of exploited labor from the Caribbean
and Asia. Military influence from the United States was even more widespread as the stability of
the new nation was imperative to completion of the project. The Panamanian government was
carefully watched over by U.S. interests though it was considered independent. It was imperative
that the formative domestic government did not harm the security or profitability of the Canal.
Massive immigration to sustain the Canal and military bases created an interesting culture which
developed into tension as U.S. influence spread into the sovereign government. In 1964, students
from Panama stormed a U.S. controlled building in the Canal Zone, considered sovereign U.S.
territory and attempted to fly the Panamanian flag alongside the U.S. flag. This resulted in the
death of 21 students and 4 U.S. soldiers. The date, January 9th, is deemed Martyr’s Day in
Panama to remember the students attempt to proclaim sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Panama
broke off diplomatic relations shortly after, demanding renegotiation of the Canal Treaty. A
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temporary agreement in 1964 led to the reopening of communication, but the resulting treaty was
not ratified by the Panamanian government. Increasing tensions between Panamanian citizens
and the U.S. occupation of the Canal Zone lingered over the next few decades. The election of
President Arias in 1967 was marred by violence caused by accusations of corruption from his
opponents. This set the stage for future perceptions of Panamanian governance and their
penchant for bribery and exploitation. Some consider the watchdog nature of the U.S. military
influenced these bribes and contributed in the degradation of political justice and due process
(Lindsay-Poland 2003: p. 69).
President Arias attempted to reorganize the national protection force against the original
agreement after his election. This resulted in a coup led by Omar Torrijos who would form the
“Revolutionary Government” and enacted constitutional changes while oppressing all
opposition, including any participation in political parties, to his directives. Torrijos used his
military influence to ensure his complete rule of the country, while allowing elections to be held
though he would be the final decision maker in an attempt to feign democratic constitutionality.
The United States saw Torrijos as a threat to the security of the Canal and opened talks on a new
treaty in 1977; the result was the Torrijos-Carter Treaty. The agreement included full transition
of Canal ownership from the United States to the Panamanian government on December 31st,
1999. Congressmen in the United States were adamant that this was kowtowing to a possible
military dictatorship, but the treaty was passed.
Over the next five years the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) came to power under
Torrijos, who placed Manuel Noriega in control after his support during the coup of President
Arias. It was during Torrijos’ ascension to power in the late 1960s that the CIA enlisted Noriega
to support overthrowing Torrijos, as the military leader was unwilling to renegotiate the treaty
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signed in 1977. The United States understood the loss of such a strongpoint in global military
control that the transition agreement in 1999 to Panama was no longer acceptable. The
unexpected death in 1981 of Omar Torrijos in a plane crash left a power vacuum in the country.
There is speculation that Noriega and the CIA were behind the supposed assassination, and this
is widely agreed upon by Torrijos’ supporters to this day. Noriega had been promoted to General
of the Panamanian Defense Forces and maintained control through the 1984 elections. Though
the former President Arias who ran in 1984 was considered the winner by many, it was the PDF
supported candidate Nicolas Barletta that was declared the elected president. The country was in
economic ruin from unpaid loans to the IMF and World Bank and lacked the massive income
available from ownership of the Canal. These factors contributed to growing civil unrest as
unemployment skyrocketed and GDP continued to fall. It is important to note during this time
that the 20-mile wide sovereign area of the Canal Zone was not affected by these economic
downturns. The Canal Zone was essentially a self-sustaining region, with little input required
from Panama. Control of power and water generation was located within the Canal Zone to
ensure security and continued efficiency of the Canal. Again, this disparity would spark
resentment for what was considered to be a U.S. occupation by Panamanian civilians.
The late 1980s was marred by infighting in the PDF and political pressure from rival
parties. Noriega was accused of rigging elections, sparking Black Friday in which hundreds of
Panamanian citizens were injured by PDF riot control in attempts to quell any rebellion. It was
made public by a former PDF officer that Noriega had been torturing and killing civilians to
extract information on his opposition. Up until this point, General Noriega had been supported
by the United States government for his cooperation on supporting the Nicaraguan Contra forces
after it was declared illegal by the U.S. Senate to continue to support the rebel force.
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The global outlook on Panamanian and United States relations worsened, leading
President Reagan to enact sanctions on the Central American isthmus in efforts to reduce the
influence of General Noriega. The Panamanian dictator was accused of drug trafficking charges
in 1988 as the U.S. government stopped all aid funding to Panama through its organizations,
causing further economic damage. The 1989 Panamanian election resulted in Noriega’s
opposition winning, only to have the election be annulled by the General as he continued his
reign.
December 20th, 1989 saw the execution of Operation Just Cause, a massive invasion of
Panama by U.S. military forces in attempt to protect U.S. citizens and free the Panamanian
population from the military dictatorship. This resulted in the largest invasion the U.S. had
participated in since the Vietnam War. Hundreds of U.S soldiers, PDF soldiers, and Panamanian
civilians were killed in the ensuing two week long engagement as Noriega held up in his bunker.
He was eventually extracted and delivered to sentencing in the United States in early January
1990. One of the most impoverished areas of the city of Panama, El Chorillo, was set aflame
during the invasion. It is not clear if this was the result of PDF actions to incite anger against
invading forces or from misguided U.S. rockets. The neighborhood was made of all wooden
constructed homes and was burned completely to the ground in under a day as fire services and
the public could not put out the raging fires. Some 20,000 people were displaced as a result
(Lindsay-Poland 2003: p. 122).
While the immediate impacts of the invasion caused record levels of unemployment and
widespread violence the previous election was reinstated and President Guillermo Endara was
given control for the constitutional allotment of five years. The election of 1993 was closely
monitored by international organizations and highly scrutinized by the United States. A former
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support of General Noriega was elected and watched closely through the next few years as fear
of resurgence in rebellion could be sparked. President Mireya Moscoso, widow to former
President Arias, was in office during the Panama Canal transfer. It took the election of Omar
Torijjos’ son, Martin, to begin institutional changes and enforcing transparency. Martin Torijjos
took a strong anti-corruption stance, but failed to gain support as many incidents occurred within
his administration that were never acted upon (Kessler 2004). The current president is a
supermarket magnate, Ricardo Martinelli, known for his business influence. His policies have
Panama increase GDP at record rates in Latin America, though questions remain if the new
income wealth is being dispersed in an effective manner as the nation still struggles with poverty
(CIA 2013).
The political turmoil and historical unrest of Panama is a result of external influences,
namely the global importance of the Canal. U.S. interests in ensuring security of the Canal
resulted in a supported dictatorship as means to attempt renegotiations. The 23-year rule of de
facto governors had incredibly negative effects on Panamanian prosperity in terms of GDP and
cultural infighting (CIA 2013). A system that lacked proper checks and balances was the
legislating force that enacted many of the fisheries laws still on the books today. Corruption was
rampant during the military rule and the current administration is constantly under fire for their
actions supporting large corporations (Jackson 2012). It is possible that this method of politician
greasing has become commonplace in the higher echelons of Panamanian politics. The Panama
Canal almost matches the GDP influence of fisheries at 7.5% (A Singapore for Central America?
2011, CIA 2013). Obviously the prosperity of fisheries is high as the income from the Canal is
seen as the most important contributor to the Panamanian economy. This would place it within
the realm of corruption to ensure it maintains the desired level of production.
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As mentioned previously, there is still a notion of cultural infighting between the main
city of Panama and the remaining indigenous tribes in the interior as well as the outlying islands
and coastal areas. Legislation was enacted to allow some freedoms for indigenous populations,
but it is still unclear if other small industrial vessels are encroaching into their tribal water or if
their uninhibited actions are causing unsustainable catch of fish.
The historical context of Panama has indefinitely influenced the manner in which it
presents and passes legislation. While this thesis cannot make assertions as to the level of
corruption within the fisheries management, there is sufficient evidence that corruption does
occur in normal business of the country (A Singapore for Central America 2011). Unfortunately
this aspect will not be directly addressed, but it should be noted throughout the analysis as it
could point to reasons for how Panamanian fisheries management has come to be such a
powerful part of the domestic economy.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Ecology and Economic Value
The TEEB study (UNEP 2011) was conducted through partnership with the United
Nations to address the issues surrounding environmental degradation. The intent of the TEEB
approach is to create a final stage of monetary valuation for an ecosystem and its services based
on peer-reviewed scientific study. Authors of the study state that “the potential for using
valuation to inform policy making is still largely unrealized” (p. 12). The approach is three-fold;
identify and assess the totality of ecosystem services and the populations affected, capture and
monetize the value of ecosystem services, and provide a basis for more informed policy
formation and analysis to better manage and sustain these systems. The use of the TEEB study
helps to found the research question of comparing economic rent derived from fisheries, taken as
the value of fish sold at market, to the wealth provided by ecosystem services. The comparison
of these two by means of monetization shows where values may be misrepresented in the case of
natural resources. Policy advocated through the TEEB method is based upon the alternatives
available to policy makers, the costs of providing the same ecosystem services through manmade measures. It is in this way that politics can be influenced with the TEEB system, as we
seek to prove.
TEEB studies are broken down into their applications; ecological and economic
foundations, national and international policy making, local and regional policy and
management, business and enterprise. For the purposes of this thesis the Ecological and
Economic Foundations (Kumar 2010) and National and International Policy Making (United
Nations Environment Programme 2011) reports will be used.
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The framework for the TEEB study is based upon the application of specific valuation
methods: market prices, market alternatives, surrogate markets, stated preference, participatory,
and benefits transfer (TEEB 2010 p. 44). A combination of these methods is used to provide a
general estimate for ecosystem services and provisions which is used for the value calculations in
this thesis.1 Each method is explained to provide policy makers and advocates tools to apply
methods that may be better suited to stakeholders. An example is the use of replacement costs in
the market alternative model. The report uses an example of human-engineered alternatives to an
ecosystem service or provision, such as water purification. Evaluating the cost of building and
maintaining a man-made alternative can provide a metric of value for the “free” ecosystem
service, provided that the ecosystem is healthy and functioning properly (TEEB 2010 p. 45).
The general estimate is based upon a total method valuation, the market alternatives listed
previously, set within net present value (NPV). The TEEB (2010) report defines NPV as “the
sum of the discounted benefits minus the sum of discounted costs” (p. 53). Discount rates in the
TEEB method are suggested to be set between one and four percent, “as we cannot assume we
will have more of this resource in the future” (2010, p. 52). The report states that fisheries may
be subject to systemic cost-benefit analysis (CBA) failure due to low rates of return when
coupled with high discount rates as would be common in capital investment scenarios. Values
and methods used in this thesis are based upon the overall TEEB estimates for the natural capital
of ecosystem services and provisions set in net present value (NPV) with discount rates between
the given 1-4% (2010 p. 53-55). High discount rates denote a greater value to current
consumption. This low discount rate provided in the TEEB analysis supports the notion that the
value of these ecosystem services is of greater value to future generations and thusly the future of
the fishing industry in terms of profit maximization and sustainability.
1

See Table 1 for general values
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Akpalu (2008) finds that implementation of high discount rates increases the occurrence
of illegal fishing as it places the economic gains in the present rather than discounting them for
future value. Fehr & Leibbrandt (2011) conducted a study of fishermen in a remote area of Brazil
that were experiencing decreasing catch numbers. They found through game theory and field
testing that lowering the discount rate of the shrimp led to more sustainable practices.
Cooperation towards more sustainable practices is also seen if fishermen are given the
opportunity to switch to less intensive methods if a certain amount of other fishermen also agree
to the same methods (Fehr & Leibbrandt 2011, p. 1151). The reduction of discount rates similar
to levels the TEEB study has suggested, with the notion set forth by Fehr and Leibbrandt, that
structured agreements can reduce fishing impact on ecosystem services and supports the
foundation of this report. The values contributed by the TEEB method are properly discounted
according to long-term sustainable practices (Akpalu 2008, Fehr & Leibbrandt 2011), while
policy making can create cooperation to reduce illegal and exploitative fishing methods. The
TEEB values and discount rates can be used to further argue for conservation of ecosystem
services from an economic standpoint, as demonstrated in a case study of the United Kingdom
(TEEB 2010, p. 54-55). It was found through the same methods and values used in this report, at
a discount rate of 3.5%, that the “cost-benefit ratio of marine conservation in this case was 10:1”
(p. 55).
The TEEB method can be used to prove that stability and preservation through valuation
of ecological infrastructure can lead to positive long-term socio-economic impacts, especially in
poor and developing areas (p. 25). Included in this approach of assessing nonmarket values of
ecosystems is the intent of eliminating subsides that overexploit said services. Payments for
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ecosystem services (PES) are also advocated by the reports to lessen the consumption and
degradation of unsustainably managed resources.
Policy recommendations in the TEEB reports are based on expert analysis and hundreds
of scholarly articles on the topic to value and internalize biodiversity and ecosystem services.
There is apprehension to enact strict environmental policy due to the difficulty of valuation and
secondary impacts. The TEEB reports resolve this through connecting policy decisions to
monetary value that is attributed to security, cultural well-being, and resource provisions to:
“[m]ake the implicit explicit” (p. 32). A historical global perspective is used in the reports to
examine how previous policy decisions affected biodiversity and the economic welfare of states.
Case studies, as well as general analyses, are combined to present an estimated value on regional
systems alongside a decision making scenario that states can adapt to suit their specific needs.
Ecological banking, land planning, and alternative valuation techniques are presented to
provide a workbook for states wishing to ensure the continuity of their natural capital (TEEB
2010, p. 43). The TEEB reports address the concept that traditionally non-valued services (i.e.
spiritual or sacred land) can be monetized when framed within a cultural biodiversity lens. An
estimated TEEB value is not assigned to these services as the authors explain they are extremely
variable based on the importance of the cultural services within that state. Ascher (1999) and
Clark (1995) state that the attempt to value ecosystem services fails to account for the intrinsic
cultural wealth imparted to the population. While Ascher and Clark claim that the idea of
monetization does not provide a proper framework for sustainable development, the TEEB
methodology has aimed to address this issue. The TEEB system is intended to provide monetary
values to systems that have market alternatives, such as artificial fish breeding for open ocean
fisheries, natural hazard regulation by means of levees, coral reefs mitigation of damage to
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coastline from storms, and production functions, the link between the change in land use of an
ecosystem and the monetary impact it has on the inputs for the system (TEEB 2010, p. 45). The
valuation of cultural services is not included in the TEEB methodology as noted in the
limitations of the study (2010, p. 63). The TEEB report does note as with all other systems and
provisioning services that simply because there is no value attributed does not make said system
worthless. This is a crucial assumption in this report as there is much discussion over the
valuation of cultural and aesthetic services and their value as result of regional and societal
differences that are beyond the scope of this research.
However, by providing methods in which national policy makers can examine these
values, they avoid the general trend of previous research to simply state that they cannot be
calculated. These TEEB methods allow a more complete analysis of all services that the regional
ecosystems can provide, informing decision making more completely.
Overall, the TEEB reports attempt to value ecosystems and their services while providing
guidelines to possible solutions at various levels of state actors. While international agreements
can be made to ensure environmental protection and sustainability, the TEEB method can also be
directed at the regional level in which decisions are made outside the realm of these agreements.
The decision to allow artisanal fishermen to use higher yield methods for fishing would not be
within the scope of an international agreement, therefore the national policy should address the
impacts of such a decision (TEEB 2010, p. 17).
The combination of ecological principals and economic provisions of services gives
policy makers an array of tools to better manage their natural resources. “Ecosystem services
account for a large proportion of the goods and services consumed by the rural poor in
developing countries” (TEEB 2010, p. 15). Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are noted as

16

having direct ecosystem services that can be used to reach the targets. Considering the above
statement that poor and rural populations are dependent upon the natural provisioning services of
ecosystems, one can assume and is confirmed by Shackleton et al. (2008) that the continued
availability of these services is critical to the survival of poor populations. Shackleton et al.
(2008) state, “there is a need and obligation for the state to underpin the safety net oﬀered by
biodiversity” (p. 523). This provides the political imperative of state action in preserving
ecosystems and their services. An estimated 80% of the Panamanian population lives along the
coast (FAO 2008) and the consumption of fish per capita is the highest in the region (UN Data
2012). The dependence on the natural resources of fisheries for the rural population is clear,
though not fully analyzed specific to Panama in any recent study. Comparatively, Panamanian
legislation of fisheries policy is decades behind the steps taken in the United States and other
‘developed’ fishing nations. Such a delay in action and enforcement is the possible cause for
current levels of overfishing. The TEEB method also serves as the foundation for this thesis as a
means of comparing ecological damage based from total value of services and economic rents of
activities consuming resources.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005) on marine fisheries lists the
following as drivers of change; climate change, subsidies, demand and fish prices, shifting food
preferences and consumption, technological change, illegal fishing, and globalization (p. 490-2).
The assessment goes on to state that, “[i]n some areas there is a lack of surveillance,
enforcement, and monitoring due to high operational costs” (p. 491). Panama would certainly be
grouped in this category due to the underfunding of enforcement agencies such as the Panama
Maritime Authority. The analysis of Panamanian legislation explores the delayed response of
fisheries management in Panama compared to that of developed fisheries.
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Conflicts of use are explored by the MEA in terms of tradeoffs of consumption. The
consumption of marine resources such as oil and gas can cause negative impacts on fisheries as
well as eutrophication of coastal areas due to development (MEA 2005 p. 492-493). The loss of
tourism and sportfishing in regions where fish stock has been deemed “overexploited” can be
detrimental to economies. Jiménez et al. (2010) found that in Costa Rica, which is not defined as
“overexploited”, the sportfishing industry contributed almost $600 million a year, equal to 2.13%
the countries 2008 GDP. The contribution of commercial fisheries to GDP was $530 million a
year in Costa Rica. While Panama lacks any academic analysis of the impacts of the sportfishing
industry, it is considered to be a dream destination for those that partake, considered to be much
better than Costa Rica. Though this will only continue for as long as larger and more desirable
fish are caught in Panamanian waters with greater consistency. Access and health of marine
ecosystems are easily spotted by sport fishermen, noticing declining catch size and abundance
decreases their chances of returning. Ensuring the sport fishing industry continues to grow and
contribute to the economy is the result of proper management and enforcement.
The MEA report also denotes that an importance placed on non-consumable aspects of
ecosystems for proper assessment. Climate change mitigation is mentioned as an important
service from marine ecosystems, one that is directly linked to fisheries management (MEA 2005,
p. 498). The geographic distribution of fish as well as the biomass can affect macro and micro
algal species of lower trophic fish, changing the ability for the system to act as a carbon sink (p.
498). While there has not been a long enough time-series analysis to definitively show the
outcome of climate change on fisheries, the decrease in biomass will certainly affect fish species
ability to adapt to any large scale changes in the marine system according to the MEA (2005 p.
498). Ensuring proper biomass size depending upon reproduction rates that ensure enough
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genetic variance in the species should be one of the main goals of sustainable fisheries
regulation.
MPA assessment and legitimacy is also addressed by the MEA report. While open ocean
no-fish MPAs experience little property right questioning, coastal MPAs are commonly fought
against by local and indigenous populations (MEA 2005, p. 498). The MEA report defines
‘aboriginal’ as “descendents of the original inhabitants of countries whose population now
largely consists of recent immigrants” (p. 499). There are distinct indigenous/aboriginal
populations in Panama, most of which live in coastal areas and are dependent upon fish as their
main source of protein (Meneses 2010). Management systems that use coastal no-fish MPAs will
be forced to address the access issue for these populations as they do not have the same intensity
of industrial fishing, but their common practice of sale and trade of fish should be monitored
(MEA 2005, p. 499). In the case of Panama, constitutional legislation allows indigenous tribes
the right to fish using traditional methods, which are commonly low-intensity and near-shore.
There is also a distinct lack of no-fish MPAs in coastal areas of Panama, save for Coiba Island
that is not populated by indigenous tribes.
The MEA (2005) report on marine fisheries also attempts to address the political aspects
of stakeholders and user groups. The report argues that the equity of access, level of catch, and
rents should be assessed on a case-by-case analysis (p. 499). Balancing the methods in which
access is granted is of particular importance in countries with competing artisanal and industrial
fishing groups, as is present in Panama. These two groups are withdrawing resources from the
same common pool resource, require similar inputs (i.e. fuel, nets, workers), yet are subject to
different economies of scale and legislative restrictions of method. Governmental subsidization
of industrial fishing is also able to increase the incidence of lowering fish prices to the point that
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artisanal fishermen are no longer able to compete (p. 500). Separating the industries through
management (i.e. license-specific fishing areas, gear restrictions, catch limits) is capable of
minimizing the political friction between artisanal fishermen that commonly garner support from
the general public, and the industrial fisheries that contribute large amounts to national GDP
(MEA 2005, p. 500; FAO 2008). It is further found that because of the institutional tendency to
align with industrial fisheries, and the political derisiveness of enforcing regulations on artisanal
fishermen that can negatively impact their livelihood, governments are usually averse to acting
(MEA 2005, p. 501). Again we see this issue occur in Panama as there is a lack of enforcement
from institutional organizations tasked with keeping industrial vessels out of MPAs and
restricting methods deemed too exploitative (FAO 2008, Meneses 2010).
The World Bank in conjunction with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
conducted a study (World Bank 2009) of international fisheries, found that 75% of all monitored
stocks are considered overexploited or fully exploited (p. 3). This proves to be an even more
widespread issue in areas such as Panama where overcapacity as result of mismanagement of
licenses combined with restricted areas can cause increased rates of illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing (Le Gallic, Cox 2005, p. 690). The lack of adequately supported
monitoring agencies in Panamanian waters effectively reduces the negative effects of being
apprehended in the act of IUU fishing (p. 691).
Research from the World Bank (2009) report shows that of the drivers of fish stock levels
include climate change as well as increases in illegal of overfishing in recent decades (p. 5). The
focus of this thesis will be the impacts of fishing activity on the wild fish biomass as the report
claims the stock is near “long-run biological maximum” (p. 3). The World Bank report draws
attention to this issue by stating, “[g]rowth in demand for fish is concentrated in developing
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countries where populations and per capita income shows strong growth” (p. 11). Panama fits
this definition with GPD per capita increases of $3,938 in 2000 to $4,785 in 2005 to $7,154 in
2009 (United Nations 2011).2 If fish consumption follows the historical trend in Panama, one
could expect to see increases in the coming years (UN Data 2011). This coupled with the lack of
a strong enforcement agency in the state, increases in profit, and restrictions from no-take marine
protected areas (MPAs) could lead to illegal overfishing (Le Gallic, Cox 2005).
Increases in fishing capacity over recent decades has had a greater impact in developing
nations that have been prone to much greater leaps of advancement through technological
advancement (p. 21). This leads to higher economic rents being received by fishing fleets,
driving incentives to catch more. The report underpins the greatest downfall of fisheries;
“economically healthy fisheries require biologically healthy fish stocks, while biologically
healthy fish stocks do not necessarily mean economically health fisheries” (p. 31). The statement
shows that there is an economic imperative, and thus moral hazard, to catch more economically
profitable fish with disregard for the health of the fish stock. Lax regulation and enforcement in
the fishing industry allows for high profits in foreign trade for developing (p. 44). Over $6 billion
per year would be attained if bycatch of fisheries decreased. The majority of this amount derived
from developing nations where methods of improvement would yield greater reductions (p. 45).
The World Bank report helps to define aspects for the rest of this thesis. Use of the term
‘economic rents’ will pertain to the “measure of the net economic benefits attributable to a
natural resource” (p. 29);
“The resource rent is a measure of the net economic benefits from the harvest of
wild fish stocks. Different fisheries generate different levels of resource rent. For
example, a fishery for a high-value species in coastal waters (which has a low cost
2

All values held to 2011 USD
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of harvesting) will generate more rent (or profits to fishers) than a fishery for a
low-value species harvested at high cost in deep water. As more fishers join a
profitable fishery, they add to the aggregate costs of catching the limited quantity
of fish available. As a result, the aggregate net benefit, or economic rent,
decreases, becoming dissipated among the fishers in the form of higher costs and
lower returns for their fishing operations or fishing effort. The rents may even
become negative when public financial transfers or subsidies are provided to
support an economically unhealthy fishery. As more fishers make greater efforts
(for example, by fishing longer hours or investing in more fishing gear) to
maintain their previous profits or catch levels, the fishers tend to deplete the fish
stock capital that sustains the productivity of the fishery. This further reduces the
potential net benefits.
As soon as the level of fishing effort moves above the point of maximum
economic yield, a situation of economic overfishing exists. Such economic
overfishing can exist even if the fish stock itself remains healthy or biologically
sustainable.” (p. 30)
This applies to both the fish stock and the ecosystem services the stock supports and is supported
by. The economic analysis of this research outlines the principal that “[t]he depletion of a
nation’s fish stocks constitutes a loss of national wealth, or the nation’s stock of natural capital”
(p. 50). The TEEB report provides guidance on the political economics of resource policy, the
ecosystem services have intrinsic values that should be considered when making decisions. This
management of a common pool resource such as fisheries falls into the realm of policy
enforcement that is not well defined. Whether or not the state has the ability to enforce policy
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beyond industrial fisheries to artisanal is questioned in the World Bank report (p. 52) as
indigenous populations are granted cultural rights to fish their ancestral waters.
To draw a parallel, Haller & Merten (2008) conclude in their study that the lack of a
strong institution, in the form of Kenyan fisheries regulation organization, coupled with a strong
ideological citizenry resulted in overexploitation and illegal methods in fisheries. The legitimacy
of the Kenyan institutions had been lost as a result of enforcement failures and the creation of
new departments in attempts to regulate was met with minimal commitment by the public (p.
713). Clearly the state having an enforcement agency and regulations does not mean that it will
become accepted by the population, especially indigenous peoples that are commonly given
limited freedoms in fisheries.
Assessment of Fisheries
Agardy’s (2000) research indicates that biodiversity is often not properly managed in
fisheries, and as a result creates negative ecological impacts at a far greater scale than previously
imagined. Agardy places the importance for conservation of biodiversity over maximum
economic yield (MEY) as the effects of overfishing apex species causes irreversible harm to the
system (p. 761). Biodiversity is given higher rank in Agardy’s system of fisheries management
due to the asymmetrical distribution of apex fish and diversity in fisheries. This offset system is
more susceptible to damaging effects of overfishing when MEY is the operative policy of the
fisheries management (p. 761). As fishing is conducted in search of apex or economically viable
species, trophic mining is experienced and affects non-targeted species. Pauly et al. (1998)
claims the trophic level of fish landings has declined over the past 45 years. An increase in
landings while eliminating top level predators was shown to trend upwards, introducing the
possibility of “widespread fisheries collapse” (Pauly et al. 1998). Essington et al. (2006) also
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states that the method of “fishing down the food web” is capable of having negative effects on
the ecology of fisheries. It is also found in Essington et al. that the North Atlantic fisheries
experienced fisheries collapse under circumstances of overcapitalization and climate-induced
decreases in fish stock (2006, p. 3173). The FIRMS (2012) report confirms these circumstances
to be consistent with the Eastern Pacific Ocean, in which Panama performs 90% of its fish catch.
This, in conjunction with bycatch of sea birds and turtles from long-lining, including raking of
the benthos by bottom trawling, demonstrates the interdependency of species in fisheries and the
extensive impacts of current practices (Agardy, 2000: p. 762).
Because there is asymmetrical distribution of biodiversity in the ocean, Agardy and Pauly
et al (1998) argue for the use of no-take MPAs as an effective tool in maintaining sustainability
in the system (Agardy, 2000: p. 762). Access to MPAs can be outlawed for fishing vessels,
providing protection for the entirety of the ecosystem as opposed to species specific catch limits.
Agardy argues that restricting fishing in these regions can also have positive effects on
surrounding areas as it provides a safe haven for spawning and ecological restoration. Pauly et al
(1998) suggests increases in no-take MPAs as a method of ensuring food-web security. These
changes to fisheries management allow it to be possible for biomass to increased, creating a
healthier ecosystem and providing greater catch for fisheries while supporting a growing stock
(Agardy 2000: p. 764).
Agardy covers a growing concern of shifting the burden of proof for environmental
impacts from industry to conservation and environmental groups. Many other large industries
that partake in consumption of natural common pool resources (oil, coal, water) are under
specific regulations to conduct intensive environmental impact studies beforehand and to
propose plans to ensure the consumption of the resource does not impact other systems. Fisheries
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are not under such regulation and Agardy argues that this leads to the industry conducting
unsustainable actions in pursuit of short-term profits while causing environmental agencies to
spend more time and money to conduct said reports to argue for regulation (2000 p. 763). The
position taken by fishermen is that any attempt to regulate the industry is a form of social
discrimination, even when academic research suggests regulation can increase economic profits
of fisheries (p. 764).
In Panamanian fisheries regulatory impacts are even more important to low wage fishing
industry workers who see short-term income increases as more beneficial than long-term
sustainability managed through regulation (p. 764). Combined with lack of enforcement and
education, fisheries such as this are susceptible to illegal practices. Agardy argues the onus
should be placed on decision makers of regulating organizations and those in positions of
political power to increase public awareness and propose legislation to place responsibility and
restrictions on fisheries. Properly managed policies coupled with education and enforcement
could result in healthier ecosystems and greater long-term economic benefit for the fishing
industry (p. 764).
The IUCN (2012) has labeled yellowfin tuna, one of the top grossing fish on the market,
as Near Threatened. This means that while the species is not in immediate threat of extinction it
requires reevaluation at set intervals to monitor progress of the population regeneration.
Mortality rates of this fish have increased in previous years, leading researchers to speculate that
regulatory methods and fishing limitations are not strict enough to ensure a sustainable spawning
stock. The report indicates that the greatest threat for yellowfin tuna is the use of purse seines
and longlines. While both methods are legal, it is their high fish catch that causes damage to the
species genetic diversity, lessening survivability in the leftover spawning stock (IUCN 2012).

25

Assuming biodiversity is being underutilized in assessing equilibrium stock catch, the
level at which reproduction rate for species is within sustainable range of the catch rate of the
species, Akpalu (2009) argues that rates should be set lower to account for this (p. 2729). The
research uses specific tuna species of fish at the top of Panamanian fisheries catch rates:
skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye. By accounting for phenotypic variance of fish, the equilibrium
catch rate is significantly lower compared to catch rates based on fish stock alone (p. 2732). By
lowering the catch rate, variance is maintained and allowed to increase, creating a healthier
ecosystem which creates better fish stock and thus higher profits for fisheries. Again, we see that
interdependence of species in marine environments is crucial to creating long-term economically
beneficial and ecologically responsible regulations.
The state of fisheries is based upon assessment of fish stock and the perceived health of
the ecosystem. Hilborn (2007) states;
“Lack of good governance, inappropriate incentives, high demand for limited resources,
poverty and lack of alternatives, complexity and lack of knowledge, and the interactions
of the fisheries sector with other sectors and the environment, have all been identified as
primary causes of non-sustainability.” (p. 153)
Attempts to confront this non-sustainability are met with poor regulation that, according to
Hilborn, convolutes the difference between MSY and MEY as policy seeks the path of least
resistance. Partial reason for this is a trend of politicians to bend to the will of fishermen in a
similar manner to farmers (Hilborn 2007, p. 154). Hilborn argues that the previous trend of
regulation places more importance on the balance of yield and employment as opposed to
maximization of economic rents and conservation of the ecosystem, as displayed below.
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Figure 1. Relationship between fishing effort and benefits derived from different objectives 3

Hilborn (2007) addressed the main conflict of ecosystem conservation as the limitation of
the ability to withdraw resources from said ecosystem decreases as efforts to conserve and
protect increase (p. 155). This can be seen in the above figure and can be used to illustrate the
struggle between academic attempts to decrease withdrawals of resources through methods such
as MPAs to reduce economic rents even further and the fishing industries push for maximizing
employment, yield, and profit (p. 155). Hilborn claims that the desire for environmental
organizations in states where the traditional method of management is followed (Fig. 1) conflicts
with industrial desires as the use of no-fish MPAs decreases biological yield, reducing the scope
of the fishing industry in supportable size of employment and vessels (p. 156).

3

Source: Hilborn 2007, p. 154
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The concept of MSY is the cause of many conflicts in regulation, as is further explored
by Hilborn and Stokes (2010). Applying the term “overfished” to fisheries in which MSY is
exceeded fails to fully explain the difference between fishing beyond levels of sustainable yield
and that of high rates of exploitation (p. 113-114). Hilborn and Stokes (2010) argue for the use of
historical levels of abundance to be used as metrics for regulation, selecting breaking points
based on historical records at times when fish stock was considered to be of adequate size to
attempt to achieve (p. 116). Through this method there is little chance for the MSY to become
convoluted in attempts to properly account for biomass and the compound effect exploitation has
on such a variable (p. 115). Hilborn and Stokes make the statement that the term “overfished” is
be inappropriately applied to certain fisheries, claiming regions in Pacific fisheries are at 98% of
MSY thereby not on the downward trend towards unsustainable levels of catch intensity (p. 117).
Their snapshot of large fisheries shows that none of them should be defined as “overfished”
when compared to a biomass baseline of zero exploitation and the current levels of intensity.
Hilborn (2010) goes on to create a new definition for measuring catch and exploitation of
fisheries, Pretty Good Yield (PGY), that is 80% of the optimum harvest rate for specific fisheries
(p. 193). Hilborn’s new assessment measure attempted to encapsulate more fully the tradeoffs
between mortality rate, vulnerability of stock, size of biomass, as well as economic and
biological concerns (p. 193-194). Doing so would offer another method of measurement to
define fisheries in terms of fishing beyond, at, or over their sustainable means. The 80% of
optimum catch level serves as a buffer for both conservationists and fishermen, attempting to
place them equidistant from their divulging desired points as can be seen in Figure 1. This
measure is then shown to allow for sustainable levels of catch to be measured in fisheries that the
traditional definition of “overfished” had previously been applied (p. 195).

28

Stakeholders are of particular interest for Hilborn (2007) as they are the key definitions of
how success and failure is labeled. Hilborn (2007) makes an important statement that within the
realm of fisheries legislation, stakeholder “winnings” are commonly zero-sum as their
perceptions of ‘proper’ management differ in terms of which benefits are more important (p.
157). It is this aspect that causes struggle for management of fisheries resources and creates a
political watershed moment, forcing regulatory agencies and their political backers to essentially
choose a side.
Cowan et al. (2012) address this political backlash of regulation by expanding upon the
methods in which ecosystem based approach to management is applied to fisheries. Their
argument stands on the foundation that applying what is perceived as complex and difficult
methods can create political issues that lead to more generally appealing “faith-based solutions”
(p. 496). The authors do operate on the basis that ecosystem management is not yet perfected,
pointing to advancements by CBD as progress, though the current traditional management
methods do not properly account for ecological aspects (p. 498). They go on to state that;
“A perfect match of ecological and management scales may be impossible, as there is no
single spatial scale that will encompass all the key components of the fishery ecosystem.
Some of the key benthic communities and habitats may have important structure on
scales of tens of kilometers or less, whereas some ecologically important highly
migratory predators in many systems disperse and migrate over hemispheric spatial
scales, creating linkages among far-distant local food webs.” (Cowan et al. 2012, p. 498)
To address this shortcoming, they offer a four question test of fisheries to provide a less
politically charged process of fisheries management. First, a system must question whether the
traditional measures of management have failed to ensure sustainability. Cowan et al. call for
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thoroughly evaluated assessment of current practices to test whether the fisheries are being
overfished. The traditional measures of management are listed as “restrictions of catch and
effort, gear limitation, closed areas, and rights-based management” (p. 498). Assessment of the
fisheries must encompass more than the levels of fish stock for the most profitable species, as
this does not provide a wide enough scope to ensure a healthy system. The “fisheries must have
sustainable outcomes biologically, economically, and socially” according to Cowan et al. (2005
p. 499).
The second question posed is whether current regulations can be supplemented to
promote health and sustainability of the fisheries. Applications such as rights-based management
should be applied in conjunction with MPAs to promote more favorable practices (p. 506). If
such management continues to fail, management should proceed to more complex systems such
as an ecosystem approach which places importance on the drivers of the fish stock as regulating
points (p. 506-507). This system will only serve as an intermediary to mitigate the more drastic
impacts on the system but will not provide a structure in which sustainability of the fishery is
improved by adequate means. Management then proceeds to the last question of whether
restoration of the fishery needs to be attempted. This is commonly a result of habitat loss and
eutrophication (p. 507).
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CHAPTER THREE: ECOSYSTEM SERVICE VALUE
Ecosystem Services
For this analysis, the use of the TEEB studies definition and characterization of
ecosystem services will be used. ‘Ecosystem services’ applies to all goods and services that the
human population can benefit from, both directly and indirectly (TEEB 2010: p. 9). As noted
previously, there are four main categories for services; provisioning, regulating, supporting, and
cultural (TEEB 2010). Within these four categories are subsets of services provided, such as raw
materials, nutrient cycling, water and waste management, and disaster prevention. This is done to
better assess what aspects of ecosystems are contributing to their economic valuation. While
these services are dependent on one another we can extract general estimates of their
contribution through careful analysis (p. 19). It is through this economic analysis that policy
makers can be better educated on possible impacts and long-term effects of implementation to
specific areas in a standardized metric of money. Public benefits of preservation and restoration
are commonly unrecognized in policy making, as they are difficult to quantify. The purpose of
the TEEB analysis and categorization of ecosystem services is to provide a toolkit with which
policy makers can be given estimates in dollar values as a way to quickly compare the cost of
possible actions. The approach labels these direct and indirect benefits as “constituents of wellbeing”, as seen in the MEA (2005) report adapted to the TEEB study.
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Figure 2. Ecosystem Services and Benefits4

Research has shown that ecosystems are capable of adapting to change and degradation,
however human impact has overloaded this ability by inflicting rapid and vast changes (TEEB
2010: p. 23). The MEA states that “[o]verfishing drives ecosystem change, including changes in
biodiversity” (2005 p. 491). The conservation of natural capital is imperative as it provides
services that cannot be imported; clean air, cultural activities, intrinsic natural beauty.
Sustainability is key to our analysis and is defined as “maintaining the capital stock necessary to
insure that economic output does not decline” (Kumar 2010: p. 15). We will apply this term to
natural capital in our comparison of economic rents of fishing to that of the ecosystem services
benefit that fisheries take from.
The importance of ecosystem services is not a constant value across populations or over
time. Those in rural areas are more dependent on these resources for their survival (Fletcher et al.
2012,
4

TEEB

2010).

The

delineation

between

Source: MEA 2005
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subsistence/artisanal

fishing

and

commercial/industrial is crucial when assessing ecosystem services and their valuation. For rural
fishermen using manual labor, the fish stock is absolutely vital to their livelihood, yet they do not
have the means to take more than they need due to limitations of their vessel and gear.
Commercial vessels have an economic imperative to capture as much as possible, and are
capable of having a higher fish catch due to their advanced gear methods. Preservation of
ecosystem services is also imperative for future generations as we are not yet able to replicate the
natural balance of these systems (UNEP 2010: p. 184). The analysis of ecosystem service
valuation attempts to serve as a general estimate for both of these populations.
Methodology of Valuation
Theory would dictate that the value of ecosystem services is infinite due to our immediate
dependence on them and inability to substitute all process effectively over a long term. We also
know that resource consumption comes at a cost. The point at which we define that cost
(manufacturing, processing, purchase, etc.) can be extended to the resource itself. Previously,
ecosystem services have been deemed as ‘priceless’ due to a lack of econometric methods to
assess their overall value, in part because of the lack of knowledge of the extent of ecosystem
services. The TEEB study, along with previous efforts from the CBD, IUCN, and the World
Bank, provide a toolkit for advisors and policy makers to value said services.
For the purpose of this analysis, we will use the combination of the direct market price
method and stated preference contingent valuation method (TEEB 2010: p. 44). Valuing
ecosystem services and their provisions through market prices will allow a direct comparison to
the economic value from fish sales. The addition of the state preference contingent is to take into
account the estimated value of other provisioning services (water quality regulation, moderation
of extreme events, tourism, etc.) that may be more imperative to a region or nation’s national
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wealth or security. An example would by Louisiana and the wetlands service of flood mitigation
taking a higher value to the limited coral reef systems on its coast. This stays in line with
Costanza’s (2000) argument that we must account for ecological sustainability as well as
economic viability. While one can argue that ecosystem services are infinitely valuable, this does
not mean that there is not a maximum economic yield for the provisions. The manner in which
MEY is defined that affects regulation and consumption of natural capital.
The TEEB report sets forth estimated values of various biomes, of which we will use
Open Ocean and Coral Reefs as these are the ecosystems directly related to fishing activities
(UNEP 2010: p. 372-5). Values are measured in dollars per hectare per year ($/ha/yr).
Table 1. TEEB Values5

5

Adapted from Kumar, P., & Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Project) 2010
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Limitations and Assumptions
Because this analysis is based on data and methods from TEEB and MEA studies, their
limitations apply here. The valuation of ecosystem services should serve as an estimate, albeit an
educated one, of provisions and biodiversity. The complexity of these systems is not yet fully
understood, but through careful study of ecology and resource economics the methods of
estimation should serve as sufficient guidelines for policy makers. It is imperative to note that
while these services should be considered ‘priceless’ due to our dependence and inability to
substitute them, the application of a fixed value should not overshadow the importance of
biodiversity. The estimated monetary value of these services is not equivalent to the idea of
“buying them back” once they are gone. This is an intangible value that must be considered
when performing comparisons in policy. There is no ‘substitutability’ for any ecosystem services
mentioned in this analysis. This means that there are no human-engineered alternatives that
complete replace an ecosystem and all the services it provides.
Also accepted, the statement, “[a]ll oceans are affected by humans to various degrees,
with overfishing having the most widespread and the dominant direct impact on food
provisioning services, which will affect future generations” (MEA 2005: p. 479).
These intangible values extend to the Cultural Services, used by the TEEB method to
account for aspects such as spiritual, inspirational, and educational value. While one could use
hedonistic valuation methods for these services, we accept the limitation of the TEEB method
which states that these values are subject to high variance due to cultural differences (2010: p.
63).
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In accordance with the Panamanian Constitutional Article 237 and the subsequent Law
No. 17 of 1959, it is accepted that the state and its organizations have sovereign right to regulate
and enforce policy upon vessels within its territorial waters.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FISHERIES PROFIT AND IMPACT
Legislation and Enforcement
While this thesis aims to address the ecological issues at stake in Panamanian fisheries,
we must also consider the political aspect. Providing the history of regulatory systems,
organizations, and policies enacted in Panama allows examination over time. This section
addresses the progression of Panamanian legislation and enforcement.
The first available legislation on fisheries in Panama is Ley No. 17 (Law Number 17) of
1959, which sets forth regulations on the export of fish from the country (Asemblea Nacional de
la República de Panamá). It is important to note that this law references the ability of the
government to regulate fisheries based on constitutional Article 237, granting the state
responsibility to protect flora and fauna. Law No. 17 also requires the use of scientific methods
to set limits which promote renewable fish stock (p. 2). This gives us the constitutional and
regulatory background to support future policy implementation that the state has the right and
ability to enact regulation as well as enforce it.
Law No. 17 Article 4 defines the following types of fishing;
“Subsistence - which has the main purpose of feeding of those who participate, their
families and neighbors, or whose daily value is not greater than the salary of a laborer.
Included in this category, for the purposes of this Decree-Law, the fishing is carried out
from the beaches and shores or from canoes or other boats classified as minor under
Chapter IV, provided that no other device is used besides the cast net, harpoon or a cord
that carries a maximum of three (3) hooks, and for which none is for sport fishing.
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Commercial - which aims to supply the domestic market of fresh and dried fish,
including employing major tools as dinghies, trawlers, gill nets, purse and trawl, hook
line and in high seas fisheries, longlines at depth or surface, etc.
Industrial - which is performed for export in order to submit the product to industrial
processes such as canning, processing into fishmeal or fertilizer, freezing, etc., but
excluding the simple process of salting and drying.
Scientific - which is made solely for purposes of research and study.
Sport - which is done as a distraction or exercise and no other purpose than its actual
conduct.”6 (p. 3)
Law No. 17 (1959) also outlines the institutions that have policy-making abilities. Most
power is delegated to the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry (Article 27). This
ministry has since split to that of the Ministry and Agriculture and the Ministry of Commerce,
and Industry. During the time Law No. 17 was enacted the Ministry served as the regulatory
body of imports, exports, and agricultural production. This Ministry would serve as the acting
body in international agreements on fishing policy, such as IATTC. There is also a special court
for disputes, punishments, and future regulation is created specifically for the fishing industry.
Even at this early time, the National Assembly outlines the rules against dumping of waste while
at sea, providing punishments of B/200.00, equivalent to USD$1,582 in 2013.7 Dumping while
underway was considered to be cost saving, thus the fine reduced the incentive to dump.
In 1964, Decree No. 127 was enacted to tighten regulations specifically of the tuna catch
in Panamanian waters. It expands the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and
Industry to include the provisions set forth in the IATTC agreement of 1963. At this 16th meeting

6
7

Translated text
Inflation calculated from Bureau of Labor Statistics
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of the IATTC (1963), it was discussed that yellowfin tuna stock had dropped below maximum
sustainable yield (MSY). The commission recommended a reduction in total catch from 81,000
tons to 73,000 tons to allow the fish stock to return to above MSY levels (IATTC 1963, p. 5).
Decree No. 127 introduced these reductions to national policy. Included are open season dates
for fishing of tuna from September 10 to August 30 of the next year and only within 12 miles of
shore (Article 3). A majority of Decree No. 127 restricts the sale of catch from Panamanian
waters in other markets. Combining these restrictions with Article 4, requiring all commercial
vessels to keep catch records of tonnage and species to be turned into the newly formed
Department of Fishing and Industry Relations (p. 4), Panama made steps to ensure proper
regulation of fisheries in attempts to promote the sustainable practices laid out in Law No. 17 of
1959. Decree No. 127 also provided the Ministry of Agriculture, Commerce, and Industry to
issue fines of up to B/10,000 (USD$74,283) for failure to report catch or have proper licenses for
tuna fishing.
While Panama managed to institute regulations with strict consequences and promoted
sustainability in fisheries management, there was no agency dedicated to enforcement of
policies. In 1998 with Decree No. 7 the Panamanian Maritime Authority (AMP) was created and
given the power to stop illegal practices within Panamanian waters. The AMP was granted
jurisdiction through the entire EEZ to ensure the promotion of national fishing regulations. This
was the first regulation in 34 years, a period known as “The Fishing Bonanza” (Meneses p. 6).
In 1970 there was an estimated 60,000 tons of fish catch, increasing to an all-time high of
290,000 tons in 1985 (FAO 2008). The lack of an enforcement agency and new methods of
fishing that decreased effort and increased catch are the most likely influences on this increase
(Le Gallic, Cox 2005).
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In 2004, the National Assembly took action to create the Coiba National Park with Law
No. 44 (Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá). This marked the first sizeable marine
reserve in the country, covering 2,171km2 (Encyclopedia of Earth). Article 2 of the law lay out
the allowance of artisanal fishing in the MPA, given that the boat does not exceed 30 feet, has a
motor of less than 55 horsepower, and the method of fishing is mostly human powered and with
a “lower technology”. Subsistence fishing is also permitted, referring back to the definition set
forth in Law No. 7 of 1959. Sectors were created to allow for sport fishing within the marine
reserve. All aspects of industrial and commercial fishing were strictly prohibited within the law.
The AMP was named the agency in explicit control of regulation enforcement within the
confines of the reserve.
Law No. 9 (Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá: Feb 2005) expanded fines
for illegal fishing practices, and Executive Decree No. 83 (Asemblea Nacional de la República
de Panamá: Abr 2005) required turtle excluding devices (TEDs) to be used on all trawlers in
Panamanian waters. Law No. 9 allowed the AMP to exact fines for all manners of illegal fishing
(safety violations, dumping, etc.) up to B/10,000. It is important to note the timeframe of
legislation for TEDs in Panama as the United States Department of State enacted laws requiring
their use on all trawling vessels in 1989.
In 2006 the National Assembly passed Law No. 44 to create a new institution, the
Aquatic Resources Authority of Panama (ARAP). Duties given to the institution were solely
administrative and policy education and formation (Article 1). There was no extension of
enforcement power to ARAP nor was it given legislative power to enact regulations on its own.
Articles 2 and 3 give imperative directions for ARAP to promote aquaculture and support new,
less invasive methods of fishing.
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Early 2009 saw the passing of Decree No. 7 (Asemblea Nacional de la República de
Panamá: Feb 2009) to outlaw the use of purse seines in the Pacific waters of Panama.
Greenpeace considers these fish aggregating devices (FADs) to be detrimental for species such
as skipjack and yellowfin tuna due to these fishes tendency to shoal with non-targeted species,
increasing the amount of bycatch (Mackenzie 2010). Again, for comparison we note that Florida
outlawed the use of all purse seines in 1967 (Associated Press). The ban was then expanded to all
Panamanian waters in July of 2010 with Executive Decree No. 239 (Asemblea Nacional de la
República de Panamá: Julio 2010b).
Executive Decree 95 (Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá: Nov. 2009)
increased restrictions on tuna fishing licenses, requiring renewal each year for domestic ships,
and 6 months for foreign vessels (Article 3). Seven months later this is repealed with Executive
Decree No. 238 (Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá: Julio 2010a). Executive Decree
98A (Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá: Enero 2010) is seen as the replacement. It
sets forth a national plan to deter and prosecute illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
fishing. ARAP is given responsibility for the regulation, but they lack an enforcement arm, and
the actual enforcement agency, the AMP, is not mentioned in the legislation. In December 2010,
Executive Decree No. 438 outlawed all use of longlines for commercial and industrial vessels
(Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá: Dic 2010). Vessel under 6 tons are still
permitted to use longline methods, as this constitutes the majority of artisanal fishing boats,
which are less intensive compared to the higher effort industrial vessels.
In early 2011, the General Assembly granted legislative rights to ARAP, with the
requirement that any resolution must be passed through the General Assembly before becoming
law. This imparted more legitimacy and autonomy for the organization tasked with regulation

41

Panamanian waters, with the intent of lessening corrupt political will. All aforementioned
resolutions passed through the General Assembly.
Panama joined the Fisheries and Aquaculture Sector Organization of the Central
American Isthmus (OSPESCA) in with the Resolution No. 74 (Autoridad de los Recursos
Acuáticos de Panamá: Julio 2011). By passing into law the OSPESCA rules and ethics, Panama
bound itself to promoting sustainable fisheries and aquaculture. To expand upon their ability to
ensure proper fishing methods, Resolution No. 86 is passed to require all vessels to account for
their gear while on the high sea (Autoridad de los Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá: Agosto 2011),
an attempt to lessen dumping of nets and gear which causes fish deaths if caught in abandoned
gear. The resolution also gives ARAP the ability to confiscate any floating gear left on the high
seas with no recourse for the owners to have it returned. This increase in enforcement allowed
more resources to be used in conjunction with the AMP to better police the waters of Panama for
illegal fishing activities.
Resolution No. 113 requires that all fishing vessels over 20 meters be registered with the
state (Autoridad de los Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá: Nov 2011). This serves to allow the
AMP and ARAP to better manage fishing vessels as well as restrict vessels larger than 20 meters
to industrial or commercial status. With Resolution No. 125, ARAP places very strict rules on
longlining, one of the more devastating forms of fishing. It requires that all vessels using
longlines must have manually powered rollers to reel in the line, no more than 600 hooks, and
sets limits on the dimensions of the rollers (Autoridad de los Recursos Acuáticos de Panamá: Dic
2011). By restricting rollers to be manually powered it requires more effort for vessels, combined
with limiting the number of hooks on the line we see an increase in effort and a decrease in
possible catch as well as turnover. While the restrictions do not place longline fishing outside of
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economic viability, it does lessen the possible impact on bycatch and overfishing. The penalties
for vessels not adhering to the new regulations are able to be fined up to USD$250,000.
Makeup of Fisheries Fleet
There are two sectors of the Panamanian fishing fleet; the Caribbean and the Pacific. The
Caribbean fleet is mostly artisanal vessels, those under 10 gross registered tonnage (GRT) as
defined by an addendum to Law No. 17 (Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá, 1959),
operated by native tribes such as the Embera and Kuna. While recommendations from ARAP
have been made to these tribes, there is no legal enforcement of seasons or catch limit because
they are protected under native law. The FAO (2008) report the MSY to be exceeded in this area
by artisanal fishermen as their numbers increase and they continue to compete for the resources
with illegal methods of catch.
A majority of the vessels in the Caribbean are artisanal, causing the statistics on numbers
of vessels to be severely underestimated, with only 500 known to be active (FAO 2008). The
main target catch in this sector is lobster and shrimp, economically valuable benthic species
(NOAA 2011). The Caribbean coast of Panama is dotted with hundreds of islands inhabited by
native tribes, all of which are largely dependent upon these species as their main source of
protein. Even with primitive methods, this growing sector of artisanal fishing has caused massive
ecological damage to the region. Because lobster and shrimp are attracted to coral reefs, one of
the most valuable ecosystem services according to the TEEB study, this is where most of the
damage from activity is done. Spalding et al. (2001) recognizes that native peoples have lived in
an almost symbiotic relationship with coral reefs for millennia (p. 57). What the area is
experiencing now is pressure of population growth, increasing the imperative to fish more, thus
causing more damage and extending past the point of sustainability.
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The issue is compounded in the Pacific region as there is increased competition among
industrial and artisanal fishermen for the same limited fish stock. Ineffective enforcement of
MPAs and illegal fishing methods has pushed the Panamanian Pacific fishery into overexploited
status (IUCN 2012). Over 5,000 registered vessels are active in this area (FAO 2008), though
this does not begin to express the large amount of artisanal fishing vessels. 80% of the
population lives along the Pacfic coast (FAO 2008). While diligent tracking of methods is not
conducted on artisanal fisheries, the FAO (2008) did report an estimate tenfold increase in the
use of gillnets from 1986 to 1995.
Because the Panamanian EEZ is so large, it allows international vessels to fish the outer
waters to maximize the economic rent from the fishery. These vessels require special permits
issued by ARAP and are monitored by the AMP through global positioning system (GPS)
trackers. According to the FAO (2008) report there were 223 of these vessels, making up less
than 5% of the total fishing fleet in the Pacific sector. These ships are highly modern, with flash
freezing capabilities and holds of over 150 GRT, making them adept at intensive fishing far
offshore (FAO 2008). Being hundreds of miles away from shore limits the amount of
enforcement that can be applied to these vessels. While they are tracked by GPS, there are no
auditors on these vessels to ensure proper methods of returning bycatch. Other industrial vessels
are required to follow the rule of law, but the ability for the AMP to actively enforce these
regulations is difficult due to the sheer number of vessels in the area.
Fishing Methods
Industrial and artisanal fishing differs in the application of the same methods of fishing.
Industrial vessels typically have larger nets or longer lines. Artisanal fishermen can use similar
methods, though their catch rate is much lower due to smaller boats and crew sizes.
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Shrimp fisheries use of bottom trawlers in Panama has shown a strong negative effect,
with a rate of 80% bycatch as well as the indiscriminate raking of the benthos by the weighted
net (Kelleher 2005). While total landings of shrimp have decreased since 1996 to present, the
damage done to crucial reefs has not reversed. Legislation has managed to keep the number of
legal shrimp trawlers to below 250. Part of the legislation rules that the vessels cannot be
replaced or modernized, meaning they are using older, more ecologically harmful methods with
a lower catch rate (FAO 2008). This low catch rate drives fishermen to spend more time trawling
to be able to bring in a high tonnage and therefore make more money. The requirement of TEDs
was advancement for sustainability and limiting bycatch in trawling vessels. The delay between
their requirement to be used on Panamanian vessels and that of a majority of the rest of the
fishing world should be noted as a specific lack of timely regulation, which had been shown to
avoid overexploitation of their natural resources.
The artisanal alternative to bottom trawling is cast netting. This method is used most
commonly for shrimp and other shallow water benthic species. The weighted circular net is
thrown by one man and pulled up from the floor. The limited size of the net decreases damage
caused to coral reefs.
Industrial longlining consists of miles of line with thousands of hooks pulled behind a
vessel. Panamanian legislation limits the number of hooks per line to limit the catch rate, more
hooks equates to more fish on the line. This increase in hooks also increases bycatch, as the
target species (tuna, mahi mahi, etc.) tend to school with non-target species as well as birds and
sea turtles. Pachecho et al. (2011) argue that changing from the common j-hook to circle hooks
would increase landing rates of target species by 40% (p. 43) though only marginally decrease
bycatch of certain non-target species. The United States and other nations have adopted
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regulations to require circle hooks due to their decrease in catch mortality. One would assume it
is in fisheries best interest to use a superior hook, though the method has not become
commonplace in Panama, and the ecosystem suffers as a result.
Table 2. Industrial Longlining catch, metric ton8

The artisanal use of longlining is similar, though not as expansive. Vessels used are
commonly less than 20 meters and lack the engine power of the larger industrial boats as
required by legislation. While both types of vessels are restricted to manually power rollers used
to reel in the lines, artisanal longline boats tend to have line lengths of less than a mile and far
fewer than the thousands of hooks.
Purse seining is only conducted by industrial vessels due to the required engine power to
pull the net through the water. The net size affects the amount and type of catch. A smaller net
8

Source: UN Data 2011
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opening means less fish can escape, leading to higher catch rate, bycatch, and mortality. Even
with the temporary outlaw of this method, it is the most common in Panamanian waters. The
CPUE is declining in Panamanian waters, indicating overexploitation of the fish stock (FAO
2008, IATTC 2012: p. 13, 14). Included in a 2012 IATTC report is the restriction of U.S.
canneries from accepting tuna caught in purse seines that were also responsible for dolphin
catch. No such restriction exists for Panamanian vessels, canneries, or waters. The closest
attempt was the temporary restriction on the method that was overturned mere months later.
These regulations have done little to direct the fishery towards more sustainable catch.
Table 3. Industrial Purse Seine catch, metric ton9

Gillnets are exclusively used by artisanal fishermen, commonly hung from behind small,
low powered vessels. These nets purposefully trap fish, indiscriminately, by their gill covers.
9

Source: UN Data (2011)
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Fish are then unable to escape from the net, causing high mortality rates as they sustain injuries
or are not thrown back before expiring on the vessel. While this method is only practiced in
remote areas for subsistence fishing it can create devastating effects on ecosystems and nontarget fish species (Meneses 2010, p. 6).
Profit of Fisheries
To properly compare the value of ecosystem services to the economic rents of fisheries,
we must have data from the fisheries. As stated previously, recording of catch and enforcement
of proper methods are not consistent in Panama. The UN Data set (2011) does have estimates of
catch value in Panama from 1996 to 2010 along with employment for industrial vessels.
Table 4. Fisheries Profit and Employment 10

As noted, these are gross market value prices to give a proper frame of reference for our
ecosystem service value comparison. The employment numbers are primary, those working on
10

Values at 2010$. Source: UN Data (2011)
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the boats and for the vessels. Secondary sector employment is not included in this analysis as
fishing is Panama’s second highest GDP contributor, but is an area for future research (FAO
2008).
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS
Results
First, we must value the totality of ecosystem services for Panama’s open ocean and coral
reefs. Using values from FAO (2008) for EEZ area and Spalding et al. (2001) for coral reef area,
applied to Table 1, the following is the result.
Table 5. Total TEEB Values for Panama11

In this view we can examine the estimated values of the various provisions within this complex
system. It is imperative that areas with no values are not to be interpreted as being a value of zero

Adapted from FAO (2008), Kumar, P., & Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Project) (2010), Wood L. J.
(2007)
11
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dollars. The limitations of the analysis deem these sectors contribution to the economy too
difficult to measure accurately, or their values would differ among cultures.
Analysis of Results
The purpose of this thesis is to address the known overexploitation of Panamanian
fisheries (IUCN 2012, FAO 2008, FAO 2012, IATTC 2012) and the lack of regulations to
correct the issue. The use of the TEEB model to compare the value of ecosystem services and the
economic rents gained from the fishing industry is to base the following analysis in similar units
of measure. The loss of fish stock equates to a monetary loss of natural capital which we have
measured in dollar values. The collapse of the ecosystem, as a result of overfishing and a very
real possibility in Panamanian waters (IUCN 2012), would result in total maximum estimated
loss of over $103 billion a year.
Economic rent is a driving factor of business and industry. In markets of natural
resources, the issue of sustainability quickly comes into question as profit drives increases in
consumption.
Table 6. Fish Consumption per capita 200112

12

Source: UN Data 2011
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As population in Panama is projected to grow, this consumption of fish per capita may grow as
well. Catch rates have already been categorized as over the MSY (IUCN). According to Kumar
(2010) and the TEEB study, continuing to consume resources, especially fish, after the MSY
point there is an exponential decrease in catch rate as well as profit. Short-term incentives of
overfishing are not properly discounted by the long-term negative effects of a collapsing
ecosystem.
The average value of the food provision, as measured through the TEEB method, is
$463,237,500 per year. None of the years for which data is provided on fisheries gross value at
market is greater than this value. The years noted in red are less than the minimum value of the
TEEB estimated food provision.
Table 7. Gross Value Compared to Minimum and Maximum TEEB Estimated Food Provision Value 13

TEEB valuations show that the fisheries in Panama are overexploited and the economic rents
currently being pulled from the ecosystem and its services are below their expected level. There

13

Adapted from Kumar, P., & Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Project) (2010), and UN Data (2011)
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is a declining trend from 2004, likely a result of the trophic mining that allowed for the highest
levels of catch in the previous years (Pauly et al. 1998). According to the IUCN (2012),
yellowfin tuna are at Near Threatened status, requiring monitoring to ensure they avoid
extinction. A failure to ensure their continued existence could result in even greater reductions in
food provision values of the Panamanian fisheries.
As shown in Table 6, the consumption of fish is higher than the average in Central
American countries. This would denote demand for the product, driving the industry to
maximize profit and provide sufficient supply. This action has the possibility of pushing an
overexploited fish stock to extinction if regulation is not enacted or enforced (IUCN 2012).
If overexploitation is not reversed, there will be a continued loss of a fish stock, and can
lead to complete ecosystem collapse (Agardy 2001, Akpalu 2010, FAO 2008, IUCN 2012).
Now we turn to the total value of the open ocean and coral reef ecosystem services.
Table 8. Gross Value Compared to Minimum and Maximum TEEB Estimated Total Provision Value 14

14

Adapted from Kumar, P., & Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (Project) (2010), and UN Data (2011)
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Again, red denotes years in which the gross fisheries value does not exceed the minimum TEEB
estimated value for total ecosystem services of open ocean and coral reefs in Panamanian waters.
Compared to Table 7 we see a higher instance of the gross value totaling to less than the
minimum TEEB estimate. As it has been stated previously, the oceanic ecosystem has strong
dependency links between services and species. The ecosystem is affected by overexploitation of
its resources, namely the biological type, resulting in diminished catch rates and thus declines in
gross value (FAO 2008). The estimate also provides an upper limit, which the gross value
attained by Panamanian fisheries reaches a maximum of about one third its value.
The TEEB method was developed to assist policy makers on decisions pertaining to
natural capital, i.e. the ecosystem from which they pull resources. Fishing is the second largest
contributor to GDP in Panama (FAO 2008). It has been clearly demonstrated the current state of
fisheries in the country are operating beyond MSY and producing economic rents lower than
would be expected according to estimates. This is due to a lack of proper regulations and
enforcement.
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Discussion
Panama is in danger of depleting the fish stock in its waters to a point it will not be able
to return (IUCN). Going beyond the point of biological return would result in the devastation of
open ocean and coral reef ecosystems due to their interdependency. It is the duty of policy
makers to create legislation that is enforceable, measureable, and does not punish economic
profit unfairly. The TEEB method of valuation helps to set the boundaries for legislation, while
scholarly research assists in providing ecologically sound regulations.
We must first examine the reasons why fisheries in Panama are being overexploited and
what parties would benefit from such actions. As previously stated, fishing is the second largest
contributor to GDP, making it a politically and economically difficult target for restriction. Any
regulations to impede the growth of profit for the industry would be seen as an attack on a sector
of the economy that creates over 9,000 primary jobs and tens of thousands of secondary
employment (FAO 2008, UN Data 2011). This can be seen explicitly in the retraction of purse
seine restrictions just months later (Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá Feb 2009,
Asemblea Nacional de la República de Panamá Nov 2009). There was public and international
support for the ban though the ARAP interpretations of what was thought to be banning lead to a
different outcome than expected (Zea 2011). This of particular importance when we consider that
the purse seine method accounts for over 80% of fish catch in Panamanian waters (FAO 2008,
UN Data 2011). The backlash from restricting its use in all Panamanian waters was quickly felt
by the National Assembly, who directed ARAP to merely “limit” the methods use. Ubiquitous
use of purse seines on industrial vessels requires regulations to be slowly applied in order to
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avoid inflicting undue economic loss as well as ensuring the political support of an important
employment sector.
Direct regulation of fishing methods would include catch limits as a secondary means of
ensuring sustainability and is supported by researchers (Akpalu 2009, Fletcher et al. 2012). Indepth analysis of current fish stock would assess and account for the regeneration time required
to maintain healthy biomass. This would provide ecological guidelines to establish a catch limit
per vessel to then be implemented and enforced at offload. Research argues that larger spaced
nets would decrease bycatch and reduce the negative impact of the purse seine method (World
Bank 2009). Reducing bycatch is shown to increase value of catch through decreasing effort
(SICA/OSPESCA 2005). The larger spaced nets would potentially allow more juvenile fish to
escape, resulting in higher spawn rates. This increase in base fish stock would create more
growth in the fish population to allow for higher catch limits and thus higher profit for fisheries.
It is difficult, given the current state of research, to assess what the exact impact of instituting
these changes to Panamanian fishing vessels would be, though we can assert that it would create
a positive increase in fish stock. The crucial question becomes the cost imparted to the vessels
and fishermen through needing to purchase new nets to avoid fines.
It is possible that the increase in fish stock, with proper management to ensure increasing
reproduction rates, could lead to higher limits of catch which would raise profit of these vessels
to possibly outweigh the original cost of new nets. Again, as fish become easier to school and
catch as result of there being a larger fish stock, we can assert that fishing effort would decrease.
This is seen as a positive from a point of efficiency, but could result in decreases in primary
sector employment of fishermen unless new vessels enter the market, which is possible as catch
limits are raised and profit margins become more appealing. It should be noted that these are just
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outcomes from passing strict legislation that merely requires larger spacing a nets in one of the
most common fishing methods in Panamanian waters. The economic and ecological benefits
have been proven in other regions, but the legislation has yet to be passed in Panama.
Longlining has been successfully regulated, from an environmental and ecological
perspective, in Panamanian waters through restriction of mechanical rollers, requiring more
effort and decreasing catch rate. As shown previously in Table 2, this regulation has decreased
the use of this method. The UN Data (2011) resource does not have reports on longlining after
2006, though it is reasonable to assume the method is still in use as it was not outlawed and can
still operate at an economic profit (FAO 2008).
While the National Assembly regulated the length of line and numbers of hooks, Pacheco
et al. (2011) argue that a more effective means of reducing ecological impact would be a change
from j-hooks to circle hooks. Not only would it increase catch efficacy but would also reduce
bycatch of sea birds and turtles. Lessening impact on non-target species increases economic rent
as there are fewer hooks occupied with bycatch. J-hooks are considered superior options in
targeted catch methods, as opposed to line-and-pole fishing where the ability to quickly remove
fish from the hook allows for faster recasting. The j-hook lessens the chance of fish being able to
come unhooked, thereby ensuring a higher rate of retention for the method.
The political and economic arguments against longline regulation are not nearly as strong
as other methods of management due to its decline in use through the region. This does not mean
that it should still not be monitored and made more sustainable. Tuck & Polacheck (1997) found
that longlining had the highest rate of non-target bycatch of any other method. This becomes a
compound issue as it negatively affects sea bird and sea turtle populations, the latter which has a
large spawning ground on specific beaches on Panama’s Pacific coast. Echwikhi et al. (2011)
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found that sea turtles in the region were more likely to feed on squid compared to mackerel. It is
common for squid to be used as cheap bait in Panamanian longlining operations as mackerel is
the more expensive option and does not impart any noticeable benefit of catch rates. A regulation
enforcing the use of mackerel bait only would decrease the incidence of unintentional sea turtle
catch. This could be argued as an effective holistic approach to ecosystem sustainability as one
sector is being regulated to ensure protection of another that could become threatened if actions
are not altered.
We must note that the culture surrounding longlining, while more established in the
region, is losing ground in terms of usage. This can become a boon for regulators as the amount
of support continues to decrease and the voice of those against any forms of regulations becomes
quieter. While artisanal fishermen are not affected, it is becoming more apparent to the public
that longlining can impart more damages to the ecosystem than positives it garners (Pacheco et
al. 2011).
Implementation of MPAs would be an effective method to promote biomass health
(Agardy 2000). This “non-direct” approach to regulation could reduce political backlash from
the fishing industry as it would impart perceived ‘taxation’ in the form of requiring new
materials for altering methods. The limitation of fishing areas would allow the free flow of fish
stock to move into unfishable waters and spawn to then be reintroduced to open water and be
caught. Arnason (2000) goes further and argues that property rights management is the most
effective form of regulation for fisheries. Allowing vessels to fish specific regions would create a
direct incentive to ensure the fish stock is well supported as the moral hazard of overfishing now
comes at a price to the fishermen’s own bottom line. The use of area restrictions has been a
common staple not only in other regions but the management of other species, namely scallops
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and clams. The difference being is that fish are able to move in and out of restricted waters,
which requires the restricted areas to be sufficiently large to allow effective protection and allow
spawning. Arnason (2000) does note that this can be a difficult balance to maintain, thus
requiring dedicated research and monitoring of fish stock regeneration. While Panama does have
organizations in place to create MPAs, as it did with Coiba Island, there is an apparent
disconnect in political imperative to continue to pursue increases in protected areas. Another
alternative to consider are the semi-autonomous areas that belong to indigenous tribes. While
still under the authority of the Panamanian government they are not subject to the entirety of the
law, specifically fishing regulations. This creates an interesting management performed by the
tribal leaders to ensure that their main staples stay abundant (Pollnac 1977). It could be that
Panama sees using tribal influence to ensure sustainability in their own regions, allowing for
areas of biological regeneration to then feed into open water available to industrial vessels. There
is a clear distinction that industrial vessels do not fish in the exact areas of artisanal vessels.
Whether this is out of respect for fellow fishermen or some alternative agreement, it does allow
for pockets of low-intensity fishing to exist. Since Pollnac’s assessment of Panamanian artisanal
fishermen in 1977 there has not been any academic analysis of this population. While they would
not be able to be monitored rigorously by governmental organizations, per constitutional
amendments, it would be telling to conduct analysis of their habits and specific catch rates. This
information could be used to further examine any possible need for influence from governmental
agencies or to draw parallels to influence industrial fishing regulations.
Enforcement of regulations and monitoring through ARAP and the AMP would be
beneficial for proper fisheries management, as their current influence cannot be specifically tied
to current management policies. Both organizations are tasked with monitoring fishing both on
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the water and at offload of vessels, but there is a distinct lack of publically available reporting
information. Through stronger presence of enforcement agencies a reduction in IUU would
decrease mortality of non-target species as well as overall bycatch. While industrial vessels are
monitored via GPS trackers, per National Assembly legislation (Asemblea Nacional de la
República de Panamá Feb 2005), it is likely that the enforcement agencies lack the capabilities to
run checks on the hundreds of industrial vessels in Panamanian waters. Patrolling MPA regions
would ensure these are kept as fishing free havens to allow fish stock to spawn and regenerate.
Direct monitoring on vessels would be an alternate, albeit more intensive solution. This would
result in more accurate reporting, providing data to better influence future catch limits and
regulations. As shown by Aranson (2000) this method of fisheries management can provide a
less politically charged option. By orienting the regulations on the marine system as opposed to
directly upon fishermen and their vessels it avoids most disapproval and accusations of levying
taxation in the form of requiring new gear.
As shown in the historical analysis of Panamanian regulations, there is still much to be
learned about the process. The influence of governance on the isthmus from external forces
could have created an adverse environment, specifically the United States desire for oligarchical
commercial control of regulations (Lindsay-Poland 2003). The support of the U.S. in Panama’s
independence and subsequent backing of Noriega shows that importance on U.S. interests was
placed higher than the domestic stability of Panama. The first legislation of fisheries was passed
in 1959 with President Torrijos taking office shortly after. Noriega was an important part of
subverting power from Torrijos. It is likely that this influenced many, if not all, policies enacted
during this time. Fisheries have been a historically large part of Panama’s economy (FAO 2008)
making legislation affecting them high profile and susceptible to corruption for ulterior motives.
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This area lacks academic support and could be further explored through specific political
analysis of Panama. However, given the news and reports surrounding current and previous
political officials it would not be beyond the ability of this thesis to assume that corruption is
present in the system and could be influenced by industrial fishing interests. This possibility is an
important aspect as we look at the whole of Panamanian legislation.
Conclusion
Overexploitation of Panamanian fisheries should be examined through the TEEB method
of valuation in order to properly assess the natural capital loss. When compared against
economic rents gained by fisheries the unsustainable direction of the industry becomes apparent.
The IUCN, World Bank, and FAO consider the current rate of fishing to be unsustainable.
Collapse of healthy fish stock would result in total loss of the estimated $103 billion ecosystem
services provided by the open ocean and coral reefs. This value is almost four times the 2011
GDP of Panama (CIA 2013) and should be considered national wealth lost and would not be able
to be reversed. While recent actions have been talked about, there has been little in the way of
implementation to show an outward attempt of ensuring environmental sustainability of fisheries.
This could be due in part to the complicated political culture of Panama.
The National Assembly of Panama has the ability to enforce legislation that would result
in sustainable methods to avoid collapse of the system. Doing so would require active legislation
directly upon fishing vessels by means of catch limit, alternative catch methods, or creation of
MPAs. These regulations require balance between ensuring fish stock longevity and maintaining
economic profitability to avoid political backlash. The values derived from the TEEB report will
provide a base level of economic rent comparison while ecological research should be applied to
catch limits and other methods of regulation. The latter will need to be expanded in the case of
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Panama as it lacks in-depth analysis to properly support legislation from an ecological
perspective.
Using an analysis tool, such as the TEEB method, to provide a monetary value for natural
resources such as the open ocean allows policy makers to garner support for regulation from an
economic standpoint. Comparisons require a common denominator and money speaks volumes
about the value of ecosystem services and their importance to a nation’s wealth and well-being.
Industry, especially the second largest contributor of GDP, is notoriously adamant against
regulation that will impact their bottom line. The use of a tool like the TEEB method can show
the specific economic losses possible to industry if their current practices threaten the ecosystem
services. From this, policy arguments can be made from the argument that to not act of current
practices could result in X amount of economic loss to the industry. This value can be specified
and altered as we account for specific species, locations, and alternative fishing methods. An
approach of this nature requires more ecological analysis, but would provide a much more
coherent picture of possible ecosystem losses and therefore more accurate values to economic
gains and losses.
It has been shown previously in this thesis that there are academically and ecologically
proven alternatives to current methods used in Panama that would reduce negative impacts on
fisheries and increase sustainability and even profitability in some cases. The political climate
behind the lack of action on these alternatives is difficult to explore as there is little publically
information available on the process of proposing legislation. Considering the surrounding
corruption of political offices in Panama, it is possible that actors involved with industrial
fisheries have coerced legislators to avoid keeping up with the global movement of fisheries
management (World Bank 2009). In examining the legislation history we see that there was a
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delay in enacting any policy to enforce the use of TEDs, though it had been made mandatory in
the United States and other countries of similar economic standing as Panama.
One explanation for the various delays in action on fisheries management (TEDs, purse
seining, bottom trawling) could be the lack of a strong environmental movement in the countries
politically active populous. While a majority of the population lives within the capital Panama
City, the majority of the remaining population lives along the coastline (FAO 2008). According
to the most recent available data the primary sector of industrial fishing employs only 9,000
Panamanians (UN Data 2011). But again, this is a politically strong group on the side of industry
as it contributes over 7% of GDP alone (CIA 2013, FAO 2008). There is a short-term economic
imperative to avoid added regulation, specifically the regulations that would impose immediate
upfront cost to vessels by way of changing gear requirements. While the best option in the longrun would result in regulation, industry has a difficult time taking discount rates into their
assessment. The TEEB method attempts to resolve this issue, but would still require politically
strong backing to garner support.
Artisanal fishermen, while not being directly regulated by the government, can suffer
from mismanagement and unchecked catch rate of industrial fishing. This thesis cannot provide
empirical data on this assumption, but the theory behind its possibility is strong. By the same
argument in Aranson (2000), Sanchirico et al. (2008), Suman (2002), and Pérez-Ruzafa et al
(2008) that fish are able to enter and exit MPAs we can assume fish enter and exit regions that
artisanal fishermen can access with their lesser developed equipment. The artisanal fishermen
and industrial vessels are truly competing for the same resources as tuna school and migrate
within the region (IATTC 2012).
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We can clearly see that there is a political power struggle here, as the artisanal fishermen,
though having far less of a direct impact on the economy and fish stock due to their low intensity
methods to avoid regulations, cannot push legislators to enact further restrictions on industrial
vessels as their political power is centered within the city and has a much stronger economic
argument for avoiding their regulation. While there does seem to be an unspoken agreement that
industrial vessels do not encroach upon the ‘territorial’ waters of artisanal fishermen for the most
part, this does not alter the fact that fish stock is estimated to continue to decline (IUCN 2012).
This could place a strain on this agreement and cause more friction between the two groups. A
further study of the political strength of these groups could lead to interesting results and provide
information on why certain regulations have or have not passed. This is an area for future study,
but it is still a valid assumption to this thesis that there is political imbalance between the groups
of artisanal and industrial fisheries.
The use of the TEEB method in combination with the various academic reports has
shown the evidence of an economic imperative to ensure sustainability of protection of
ecosystems and their services. Through the use of replacement and alternative pricing models the
UNEP supported study provided guidance to establishing monetary maximum and minimum
values for the open ocean and coral reef systems, the two main ecosystems directly affected by
fishing activity. Costanza (2000) argues that we should be careful in our valuation as it can be
misused and the methodology, while improving, is not foolproof or all-encompassing of
unforeseen variables in the future.
The political culture in Panama is quite convoluted due to the external influences
throughout its history. Legislative processes of fisheries management are likely to be as
corruptible, or already corrupted, as the rest of the political arena that includes presidents. There
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are further restrictions that could increase ecological sustainability in measureable ways that are
not being enacted by the National Assembly. This is likely a result of a strong political presence
of environmentally conscious persons with the ability to fight a likely strong and well-connected
industrial fishing lobby.
The hypothesis of this thesis was that Panama is not extracting the full amount of
economic rents available from its fisheries. According to the assumptions and methodology of
the TEEB valuation, it is falling far short of what it could be drawing from the territorial waters
compared to commercial economic rents. Further specific analysis of the political structure and
actors in the commercial fishing industry would assist in providing a holistic explanation. But
through the research conducted it would be reasonable to assert that Panama is not properly
discounting the value of these ecosystems and their provisioning services. Given the general
consensus of research cited in this thesis that ecological collapse is possible in the most
profitable fish species in Panama, the lack of action could result in massive losses of the second
largest contributor of GDP in the country, right behind the Panama Canal.
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